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i 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Like twenty-nine other states and the District of 
Columbia, New Mexico has enacted a statute 
specifically designed to deter SLAPP (“strategic 
lawsuits against public participation”) lawsuits, which 
unduly discourage speech and engagement about 
matters of public concern.   
New Mexico’s “anti-SLAPP” statute requires 
expedited disposition of dismissal motions and an 
award of attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing 
defendant.  In the decision below, the Tenth Circuit 
held that those provisions are inoperative in federal 
court—deepening an entrenched circuit split on the 
applicability of state anti-SLAPP provisions in federal 
court.  
The questions presented are: 
1.  Whether a state anti-SLAPP provision requiring 
an award of attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing 
defendant applies in federal court—as the First, 
Second, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have concluded, in 
conflict with the D.C. Circuit and the Tenth Circuit 
below. 
2.  Whether a state anti-SLAPP provision requiring 
expedited disposition of dismissal motions applies in 
federal court, as the First and Fifth Circuits have 
concluded, in conflict with the D.C. Circuit and the 
Tenth Circuit below.  
  
ii 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
Petitioners are AmeriCulture, Inc., a New Mexico 
corporation, and Damon Seawright, an individual, 
defendants-appellants in the court below. 
Respondents are Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC, 
and Lightning Dock Geothermal, HI-01, LLC, both 
Delaware corporations, plaintiffs-appellees in the court 
below.  
  
iii 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 29.6 of this Court, Petitioner 
AmeriCulture, Inc. states that it has no parent 
corporation, and no publicly held company owns 10% 
or more of its stock.  Petitioner Damon Seawright is an 
individual.  
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OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit (App. 1a-33a) is reported at 885 
F.3d 659.  The opinion of the United States District 
Court for the District of New Mexico denying 
Petitioners’ motion to dismiss is available at 2016 WL 
8254920 and reproduced at App. 40a-51a.  The opinion 
of the District Court certifying its order for 
interlocutory appeal is available at 2016 WL 8261743 
and reproduced at App. 34a-39a. 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals entered judgment on March 
12, 2018.  On April 4, 2018, Justice Sotomayor 
extended the time to file a petition for certiorari to and 
including July 16, 2018 (No. 17A1064).  This Court has 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
The statutory provisions and rules relevant to this 
petition, including the Rules of Decision Act, the Rules 
Enabling Act, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, New 
Mexico’s anti-SLAPP statute, and the anti-SLAPP 
statutes implicated in the other cases relevant to the 
circuit splits discussed in this petition are reproduced 
in the Appendix at 52a-78a.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than 
self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”  
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).  
To protect their citizens’ rights to participate freely 
in self-government, thirty states and the District of 
Columbia have enacted “anti-strategic lawsuits against 
public participation” (or “anti-SLAPP”) statutes to 
deter lawsuits that chill speech and engagement about 
matters of public concern.  The decision below 
deepened a circuit split over whether such state anti-
SLAPP laws apply in federal courts exercising 
jurisdiction over state law claims.1 
New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP statute features two 
mechanisms to protect against SLAPP suits: (1) it 
requires “expedited” consideration of a defendant’s 
motion to dispose of the case, and (2) it requires an 
award of attorneys’ fees to a defendant who invokes the 
statute as a defense and obtains dismissal.  In the 
decision below, the Tenth Circuit held—in conflict with 
other circuits (and in accord with the D.C. Circuit)—
that those state anti-SLAPP protections are 
inoperative in federal court. 
                                            
1 While the plaintiffs in this case invoked the District Court’s 
diversity jurisdiction, infra at n. 3, the questions presented here 
can arise whenever federal courts exercise jurisdiction over state 
law claims, such as pursuant to the supplemental jurisdiction 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 
(1988). 
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The Tenth Circuit’s holding was incorrect.  As 
several other circuits have recognized when 
confronting similar state anti-SLAPP provisions, those 
provisions do not conflict with any federal rule, and are 
part of the substantive “law of the state” that must 
apply in federal court unless federal law says 
otherwise. 
The decision below also interferes with state-
created rights.  New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP statute was 
designed and enacted “to protect citizens who exercise 
their right to petition from the financial burden of 
having to defend against retaliatory lawsuits.”  
Cordova v. Cline, 396 P.3d 159, 166 (N.M. 2017).  That 
objective was frustrated by the Tenth Circuit’s refusal 
to apply the State’s anti-SLAPP law in federal court. 
And, ironically, the decision below encourages 
precisely the kind of forum-shopping the Erie doctrine 
seeks to avoid—in at least two respects.  The refusal to 
give effect in federal court to state anti-SLAPP laws 
will encourage the filing of SLAPP suits in federal 
court.  But the disagreement among courts of appeals 
about the questions presented also means that a given 
state’s anti-SLAPP law may be enforced in some 
federal courts but not others—encouraging plaintiffs to 
cherry-pick among federal courts to avoid application 
of the statutes. 
The Court should grant the petition to resolve the 
circuit split regarding the important questions 
presented. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Legal Background 
1. The Erie/Hanna Doctrine 
This case concerns an important, contemporary 
application of the familiar and longstanding rule that 
“roughly, . . . federal courts are to apply state 
‘substantive’ law and federal ‘procedural’ law” when 
adjudicating state law claims.  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 
U.S. 460, 471 (1965); see also Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-79 (1938).  
This Court has explained that a federal rule 
governs the matters to which it applies, so long as the 
rule is consistent with the Constitution, and with the 
Rules Enabling Act, which requires that the federal 
rules “shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any 
substantive right.”  28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).  Where there 
is no federal rule on point, the Rules of Decision Act 
requires that federal courts apply the “law of the state” 
within the meaning of that Act, as interpreted in Erie 
and its progeny.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1652; Walker v. Armco 
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-52 (1980). 
While familiar, this framework has occasionally 
presented this Court with challenging questions.  See 
Walker, 446 U.S. at 744 (“The question whether state 
or federal law should apply on various issues arising in 
an action based on state law which has been brought in 
federal court under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction 
has troubled this Court for many years.”). 
In Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 
(1945), this Court set out what later became known as 
the “outcome-determination” test for whether the Rules 
of Decision Act and Erie make a state-law rule 
applicable in federal court.  The Court explained that 
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Erie’s intent “was to insure that, in all cases where a 
federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of 
the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome 
of the litigation in the federal court should be 
substantially the same . . . as it would be if tried in a 
State court.  The nub of the policy that underlies Erie 
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction 
the accident of suit by a non-resident litigant in a 
federal court instead of in a State court a block away, 
should not lead to a substantially different result.”  Id. 
at 109.  The Guaranty Trust Court accordingly 
concluded that a New York statute of limitations 
barring recovery in a suit if brought in state court 
“bears on a State-created right vitally and not merely 
formally or negligibly,” and that because the 
consequences of the rule “so intimately affect recovery 
or non-recovery,” it should apply in federal court.  Id. 
at 110. 
In Hanna, 380 U.S. 460, the Court announced 
another “pathmarking” decision, in which it explained 
that Erie “command[s] the enforcement of state law” 
only where there is “no Federal Rule which cover[s] the 
point in dispute.”  Id.  Where a federal rule conflicts 
with a state rule on the same point, Hanna held the 
federal rule controls so long as it falls within 
Congress’s “power to regulate matters which, though 
falling within the uncertain area between substance 
and procedure, are rationally capable of classification 
as either.” Id. at 472.  As for the “outcome-
determination” test, the Hanna court explained it 
should be read in light of “the twin aims of the Erie 
rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance 
of inequitable administration of the laws.”  Id. at 468.   
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In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 
U.S. 415 (1996), the Court addressed the application of 
the Erie/Hanna doctrines to a New York statute that 
permitted the state’s appellate courts “to order new 
trials when the jury’s award ‘deviates materially from 
what would be reasonable compensation.’” Id. at 418 
(quoting N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & Rules (CPLR) 
§ 5501(c)).  Recognizing that the provision at issue 
contained “both ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’” aspects, 
the Court explained that the “dispositive question” was 
“whether federal courts can give effect to the 
substantive thrust of § 5501(c) without untoward 
alteration of the federal scheme for the trial and 
decision of civil cases.”  Id. at 426.  The Court 
determined they could, holding: New York’s 
substantive “deviates materially” standard applies in 
federal court, but primary responsibility for its 
application would be “lodge[d] in the district court, not 
the court of appeals,” in light of the Seventh 
Amendment’s constraint on appellate review of jury-
found facts.  Id. at 437-38. 
More recently, this Court considered whether 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 precluded the 
application in federal court of a New York statute 
barring “a suit to recover a ‘penalty’ from proceeding as 
a class action.”  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 397 (2010). 
Five Justices concurred in a judgment reversing the 
court below, concluding that Rule 23 preempted the 
New York law, but without agreeing on a single 
rationale.  
In the only section of any opinion to command a 
majority of the Court, Justice Scalia explained that 
because in that case the federal and state rules were in 
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conflict—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 provided 
that a class action like Shady Grove’s “may be 
maintained,” while the New York statute provided that 
a class action seeking penalty damages “may not be 
maintained”—the state rule could not apply in federal 
court unless the federal rule was invalid.  Id. at 399. 
The Court fractured on the next steps in the 
analysis, however.  Justice Scalia wrote that upon 
finding a conflict between a federal and state rule—
where the rules “attempt[] to answer the same 
question,” 559 U.S. at 399—the only remaining inquiry 
is whether the federal rule is valid.  Id. at 407-09.   If 
so, it controls.  Id.   
Justice Scalia explained that a federal rule 
promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act is valid so 
long as it governs “only the manner and the means by 
which the litigants’ rights are enforced,” and does not 
“alter[] the rules of decision by which the court will 
adjudicate those rights.”  Id. at 407.  According to 
Justice Scalia, a federal rule’s validity does not depend 
on whether it affects a litigant’s state-created 
substantive rights.  Id. at 407, 408-410.  A federal 
procedural rule is either valid or invalid in all 
jurisdictions and all cases.  Id. at 409-10. 
Justice Stevens, the fifth vote to reverse, agreed 
there was a conflict between Rule 23 and the New York 
law, but disagreed with the next steps in Justice 
Scalia’s analysis.  In Justice Stevens’s view, where 
federal and state rules appear to conflict, the Rules 
Enabling Act’s command that the Federal Rules “shall 
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right” 
means “federal rules cannot displace a State’s 
definition of its own rights or remedies.”  Id. at 418.  
Therefore, “federal rules must be interpreted with 
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some degree of sensitivity to important state interests 
and regulatory policies, and applied to diversity cases 
against the background of Congress’ command that 
such rules not alter substantive rights and with 
consideration of the degree to which the Rule makes 
the character and result of the federal litigation stray 
from the course it would follow in state courts.”  Id. at 
418-19.   
Although Justice Stevens conceded this can be 
“tricky” to implement,” he explained “the balance . . . 
turns, in part, on the nature of the state law that is 
being displaced by a federal rule.”  Id. at 419.  The 
“nature of the state law,” meanwhile, “does not 
necessarily turn on whether the state law at issue 
takes the form of what is traditionally described as 
substantive or procedural.  Rather, it turns on whether 
the state law actually is part of a State's framework of 
substantive rights or remedies.”  Id. 
Justice Stevens laid out a two-step framework that, 
in his view, this Court’s precedents require courts to 
implement: “The court must first determine whether 
the scope of the federal rule is sufficiently broad to 
control the issue before the court, thereby leaving no 
room for the operation of seemingly conflicting state 
law,” including after the federal rule has been “fairly 
construed, with sensitivity to important state interests 
and regulatory policies.”  Id. at 421.   
Then—if the federal rule is “sufficiently broad to 
control the issue before the Court, such that there is a 
‘direct collision’” between the federal and state rule—
the court must decide whether the rule is a valid 
exercise of the Court’s power to prescribe rules under 
the Rules Enabling Act.  Id. at 422.  Here again, a 
reviewing court has an obligation to construe the 
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federal rule narrowly, where possible, to avoid an 
interpretation that would “abridge, enlarge, or modify 
a substantive right,” including one cloaked in the guise 
of a state procedural rule.  Id. at 422-23.  If such a 
“saving construction” is impossible, “federal courts 
cannot apply the rule.”  Id. at 423. 
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg and three other 
Justices concluded that there was “no unavoidable 
conflict” between Rule 23 and New York’s law,  id. at 
452, and that “[w]hen no federal law or rule is 
dispositive of an issue, and a state statute is outcome 
affective . . . the Rules of Decision Act commands 
application of the State’s law in diversity suits,” id. at 
456.  The four dissenting Justices therefore would have 
held that New York’s law applies in federal court.  Id. 
at 458. 
2. Anti-SLAPP Statutes 
Three decades ago, Professors George Pring and 
Penelope Canan warned of a “new and very disturbing 
trend”: “Americans by the thousands [were] being sued, 
simply for . . . ‘speaking out’ on political issues.”  
George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, “Strategic 
Lawsuits Against Public Participation” (“SLAPPs”): An 
Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 
Bridgeport L. Rev. 937, 938 (1992); see also Penelope 
Canan & George W. Pring, Research Note, Studying 
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: 
Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 L. 
& Soc’y Rev. 385, 386 (1988).  To describe such 
lawsuits, Professors Pring and Canan coined the term 
“Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,” or 
“SLAPP.”   
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The “disturbing trend” identified by Professors 
Pring and Canan thirty years ago persists—and, 
according to some, has intensified.  See Jeremy Rosen 
& Felix Shafir, Helping Americans to Speak Freely, 18 
Federalist Soc’y Rev. 62, 70 (2017) (“Each year, more 
and more people across the country are sued for 
speaking out”); Timothy D. Biché, Note, Thawing 
Public Participation: Modeling the Chilling Effect of 
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation and 
Minimizing Its Impact, 22 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 421, 
422-23 (2013) (“Over the past forty years, there has 
been a surge in the number of lawsuits brought in 
retaliation for a citizen’s exercise of his or her right to 
petition.”); Katelyn E. Saner, Note, Getting SLAPP-ed 
in Federal Court: Applying State Anti-SLAPP Special 
Motions to Dismiss in Federal Court After Shady 
Grove, 63 Duke L.J. 781, 789 (2013) (“[T]he advent of 
the Internet as a new means for speaking out publicly 
has greatly increased the number of SLAPP suits.”). 
Seeking to deter SLAPP suits, thirty states and the 
District of Columbia have enacted anti-SLAPP 
statutes, “to give more breathing space for free speech 
about contentious public issues.”  Abbas v. Foreign 
Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2015); 
see also Robert Post, Reply: Understanding the First 
Amendment, 87 Wash. L. Rev. 549, 550 (2012) (most 
states have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes “tak[ing] 
account of the transaction costs” and chilling effects “of 
litigating First Amendment rights”); Colin Quinlan, 
Note, Erie and the First Amendment: State Anti-
SLAPP Laws in Federal Court After Shady Grove, 114 
Colum. L. Rev. 367, 370 (2014) (SLAPP suits “inhibit[] 
the exercise of First Amendment rights, because even 
targets who persevere and eventually prevail on the 
merits must spend substantial time and money to do 
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so, and the experience deters them from speaking out 
in the future.”). 
Common anti-SLAPP provisions include expedited 
consideration of motions to dismiss, modification of the 
standard of proof on such a motion, a stay discovery 
while an anti-SLAPP motion is pending, and award of 
attorney’s fees for a prevailing defendant.    
3. New Mexico’s Anti-SLAPP Statute 
New Mexico enacted its anti-SLAPP statute in 
2001.  The original bill was the product of bipartisan 
sponsorship in New Mexico’s House of Representatives, 
and—hardly coincidentally, but appropriately given 
the facts of this case—emerged in the wake of two 
high-profile lawsuits designed to “intimidat[e] citizen 
opposition in public forums to land development 
projects,” which two scholars have described as “classic 
SLAPP suits.”  Frederick M. Rowe & Leo M. Romero, 
Resolving Land-Use Disputes by Intimidation: SLAPP 
Suits in New Mexico, 32 N.M. L. Rev. 217, 219 (2002); 
see also id. at 226-27 (describing passage of the law). 
New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP statute declares that “it 
is the public policy of New Mexico to protect the rights 
of its citizens to participate in quasi-judicial 
proceedings before local and state governmental 
tribunals.”  N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.2.  Finding that 
lawsuits frustrating these rights “have been filed,” the 
statue provides they “should be subject to prompt 
dismissal or judgment to prevent the abuse of the legal 
process and avoid the burden imposed by such baseless 
lawsuits.”  Id.; see also Cordova, 396 P.3d at 166 
(“[T]he purpose of the statute is to protect citizens who 
exercise their right to petition from the financial 
burden of having to defend against retaliatory 
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lawsuits.”). Accordingly, the statute’s Subsection A—its 
expedited disposition provision—states: 
Any action seeking money damages against a 
person for conduct or speech undertaken or 
made in connection with a public hearing or 
public meeting in a quasi-judicial proceeding . . . 
is subject to a special motion to dismiss . . . that 
shall be considered by the court on a priority or 
expedited basis to ensure the early consideration 
of the issues raised by the motion and to prevent 
the unnecessary expense of litigation. 
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.1(A).   
Subsection B, the fee-shifting provision, provides 
that the statute may be raised “as an affirmative 
defense,” and that where a defendant raises “the rights 
afforded” by the statute and prevails on a motion to 
dismiss, “the court shall award reasonable attorney 
fees and costs incurred by the moving party in 
defending the action.”  Id. § 38-2-9.1(B).2 
B. Facts and Proceedings Below 
Petitioner Damon Seawright is co-founder and 
President of Petitioner AmeriCulture, Inc. 
(“AmeriCulture”), an aquaculture company specializing 
in the farming of Nile tilapia.  Since 1995, 
AmeriCulture has operated a tilapia farm on its 15-
acre property in southwestern New Mexico, rearing 
                                            
2  Although the provision is not implicated here, New Mexico’s 
anti-SLAPP statute also provides for an expedited appeal from a 
trial court’s order disposing of an anti-SLAPP motion, or from a 
trial court’s “failure to rule on the motion on an expedited basis.”  
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.1(C). 
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tilapia on pure, naturally heated well water drawn 
from the geothermal aquifer beneath the land. 
Respondent Los Lobos Renewable Power Company, 
LLC (“Los Lobos”) is the sole member of Respondent 
Lightning Dock Geothermal HI-01, LLC (“LDG”).  C.A. 
App. 116 (Am. Compl. ¶ 1).  LDG is the current lessee 
of a geothermal resources lease from the Bureau of 
Land Management.  Id. at 118 (Am. Compl. ¶ 9).  LDG 
uses the underground resources for geothermal power 
generation.  Id.  
Some of the geothermal resources included in LDG’s 
federal lease underlie AmeriCulture’s land.  When 
AmeriCulture began operations in 1995, it entered into 
a Joint Facilities Operating Agreement (“JFOA”) with 
LDG’s predecessor on the federal lease, reconciling 
each party’s rights in the geothermal resources under 
AmeriCulture’s land.  C.A. App. 138-145.  In that 
agreement, LDG’s predecessor granted AmeriCulture 
the right to “drill and develop” any geothermal 
resources under AmeriCulture’s land up to a depth of 
1,000 feet, so long as AmeriCulture’s activity is 
intended for uses other than electric generation, like 
supplying heated water to AmeriCulture’s fish-farming 
facilities.  C.A. App. 140.  LDG is now the successor to 
the federal lease and assignee of its predecessor’s 
rights and obligations under the JFOA.  C.A. App. 118-
19. 
The dispute giving rise to this case centers on 
Petitioners’ participation in public proceedings related 
to activities that Respondents planned to carry out on 
land not covered by the JFOA.  App. 3a-4a; C.A. App. 
171.  In 2011, AmeriCulture was among the dozens of 
parties who filed protests with the New Mexico State 
Engineer relating to Respondents’ application for a 
  
 
14 
 
permit relating to wells that would produce water for 
use at their power plant.  C.A. App. 41, 201-
04.  Respondents also separately applied to the New 
Mexico Oil Conservation Division for permits relating 
to three shallow injection wells, all of which were off 
the property covered by the JFOA.  C.A. App. 47-
57.  AmeriCulture also filed a protest to that 
application.  C.A. App. 58. 
Six days after Petitioners filed their protest with 
the Oil Conservation Division, Respondents 
commenced a lawsuit in federal district court against 
them, asserting claims based on their petitioning 
activities, App. 3a-4a; C.A. App. 127-28 (Am. Compl. 
¶ 44), and seeking declaratory, injunctive and 
monetary relief.  C.A. App. 129-136.3  Expressly 
invoking their rights under New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP 
statute, Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint, 
seeking both expedited dismissal and an award of 
attorneys’ fees.  App. 4a, 43a; C.A. App. 29-40.   
Without reaching the substance of Petitioners’ anti-
SLAPP motion, the District Court denied it, holding 
that “New Mexico’s Anti-SLAPP statute is a procedural 
provision that does not apply in the courts of the 
United States.”  App. 35a, 43a.  However, the District 
Court “observe[d] disagreement among the courts of 
appeals” about whether state anti-SLAPP provisions 
apply in federal court.  App. 46a; see id. at 46a-47a 
                                            
3  Respondents invoked the District Court’s jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332, alleging complete diversity among the parties, and 
that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 excluding interest 
and costs.  App. 42a-43a.  
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(reviewing holdings of the First and Ninth Circuits in 
conflict with that of the D.C. Circuit).     
Petitioners sought leave to file an interlocutory 
appeal to the Tenth Circuit.  App. 35a.  The District 
Court granted that motion, holding that its order 
denying the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss was 
immediately appealable under the collateral order 
doctrine, App. 35a-37a, and separately certifying its 
order for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b), App. 38a-39a.  As the District Court 
explained, it reached that latter conclusion because 
“the applicability of state Anti-SLAPP statutes in 
diversity cases is an important question of law about 
which the circuits are divided.”  App. 39a.  
The Tenth Circuit affirmed.4  After noting that 
“Justice Stevens’ concurrence in Shady Grove provides 
the controlling analysis in the Tenth Circuit” on 
questions of state-law application in federal diversity 
suits, App. 17a n.3, the panel explained its view that 
an “overriding consideration” in such cases is whether 
the state provision at issue would be outcome-
determinative.  App. 16a-17a.  According to the panel, 
“[t]his means that in a federal diversity action, the 
district court applies state substantive law—those 
rights and remedies that bear upon the outcome of the 
suit—and federal procedural law—the processes or 
modes for enforcing those substantive rights and 
remedies.”  App. 17a. 
                                            
4  The panel held that it had appellate jurisdiction under the 
collateral order doctrine, after concluding Petitioners had not 
timely applied to the Tenth Circuit for permission to file an 
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  App. 8a-16a. 
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The panel observed that “distinguishing between 
procedural and substantive law is not always a simple 
task,” and that “[w]here the line between procedure 
and substance is unclear, the Supreme Court has set 
forth a multi-faceted analysis designed to prevent both 
forum shopping and the inequitable administration of 
the laws.”  App. 17a-18a.   
The panel, however, disclaimed the need for any 
such analysis in the case of New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP 
statute, calling it “hardly a challenging endeavor” to 
determine whether the statute’s provisions should 
apply in federal court, “assuming one is able to 
read.”  App. 18a.  
The panel concluded that New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP 
statute “is nothing more than a procedural mechanism 
designed to expedite the disposal of frivolous 
lawsuits” (App. 18a; see also App. 27a), and therefore 
may not be applied in federal court.  The panel also 
determined the statute’s fee-shifting provision may not 
be applied in federal court, calling the provision 
“entirely meaningless absent” the expedited motion-to-
dismiss provision,5 and merely a “sanction” “designed 
not to compensate for legal services but to vindicate 
First Amendment rights threatened by a kind of 
unwarranted or specious litigation.”  App. 23a.  
                                            
5  The panel did not acknowledge or discuss the statute’s 
severability provision, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.1(F).  See App. 
19a.  
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 
I. There Is a Circuit Split on the Applicability of 
State Anti-SLAPP Fee-Shifting Provisions in 
Federal Court 
Nearly every jurisdiction which has enacted an 
anti-SLAPP statute has provided for an award of 
attorneys’ fees to a prevailing defendant.6  Both before 
and after Erie, this Court has made clear that a state 
statute awarding attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party 
“reflects a substantial policy of the state,” which 
“should be followed” in diversity litigation unless it 
“run[s] counter to a valid federal statute or rule of 
court” which “usually it will not.”   Alyeska Pipeline 
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 
(1975) (quoting 6 Moore, Federal Prac. 54.77(2), at 
1712-13 (2d ed. 1974)); see People of Sioux Cnty. v. 
Nat’l Surety Co., 276 U.S. 238, 243 (1928); see also 
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 52 (1991) (“fee-
                                            
6  See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-752(D); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-63-
506(b)(1); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c)(1); Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§ 52-196a(f); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8138(a)(1); D.C. Code § 16-
5504(a); Fla. Stat. § 768.295(4); Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-11.1(b.1); 
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634F-2(8)(B); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 110/25; Ind. 
Code § 34-7-7-7; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-5329(g); La. Code Civ. Proc. 
Ann. art. 971(b); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 556; Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 231 § 59(H); Minn. Stat. § 554.04(1); Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 537.528; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,243(1); Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 41.670(1)(a); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.1(B); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law 
§ 70-a(1)(a); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1438(A)(1); Or. Rev. Stat. 
§ 31.152(3); 27 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7707; R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(d); 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-1003(c); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 
§ 27.009(a)(1); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1405(1)(a); Vt. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 12, § 1041(f)(1); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-223.2(B). 
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shifting rules . . . embody a [state] substantive policy” 
when a statute “permits a prevailing party in certain 
classes of litigation to recover fees”). 
Consistent with that understanding, several 
circuits have applied the fee-shifting provisions of anti-
SLAPP statutes.  Two circuits, however, including the 
Tenth Circuit in the decision below, have concluded 
otherwise. 
A. Several Circuits Have Held That Anti-
SLAPP Fee-Shifting Provisions Apply in 
Federal Court 
In United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed 
Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999), the 
Ninth Circuit determined that certain provisions of the 
California anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. P. Code 
§ 425.16, must apply in federal court.  Id. at 973.  
Among those was Cal. Civ. P. Code § 425.16(c), which 
provides that a defendant who prevails with an anti-
SLAPP motion “shall be entitled to his or her 
attorney’s fees and costs.”  Cal. Civ. P. Code 
§ 425.16(c).  Newsham, 190 F.3d at 972-73.  The Ninth 
Circuit observed that the fee-shifting provision of 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute did not conflict with 
any federal rule.  Id.  Next, the court determined that 
California’s anti-SLAPP law furthered substantive 
interests, and that applying the law in federal court 
advanced the “twin purposes” of Erie—discouraging 
forum-shopping and avoiding inequitable 
administration of the law.  Id. at 973.  Unpreempted by 
a valid federal law, California’s anti-SLAPP fee-
shifting provision therefore applied in federal court.  
Id. 
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Since Newsham, the Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly 
held that the [California] anti-SLAPP provisions 
governing attorneys’ fees apply to state-law claims in 
federal court.”  Law Offices of Bruce Altschuld v. 
Wilson, 632 Fed. App’x 321, 322 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(affirming an anti-SLAPP fee award and citing cases); 
see also Khai v. Cnty. of L.A., --- Fed. App’x ---, 2018 
WL 1476646, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 2018) (affirming 
award of attorneys’ fees, which “are mandatory for a 
successful anti-SLAPP motion”).7  And the Ninth 
Circuit has extended its holding in Newsham to apply 
to Oregon’s anti-SLAPP statute, including its fee-
shifting provision.  See Northon v. Rule, 637 F.3d 937, 
                                            
7  The Ninth Circuit subsequently reaffirmed Newsham while 
declining to reconsider its holding en banc.  See Makaeff v. Trump 
Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc denied, 
736 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2013).  Concurring in the denial of 
rehearing en banc, Judges Wardlaw and Callahan (joined by 
Judges Fletcher and Gould) reaffirmed the reasoning of Newsham, 
explaining it was unaltered by Shady Grove.  736 F.3d at 1181 
(Wardlaw, J., and Callahan, J., concurring in the denial of 
rehearing en banc).  Judge Watford dissented from the court’s 
denial of rehearing en banc, joined by then-Chief Judge Kozinski 
and Judges Paez and Bea.  In their view, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 12 and 56 together “establish the exclusive criteria for 
testing the legal and factual sufficiency of a claim in federal 
court.”  Id. at 1188 (Watford, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc).  But the dissent made no specific argument 
that California’s anti-SLAPP fee-shifting provision should not 
apply in federal court.  Id. at 1188-92.  
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938-39 (9th Cir. 2011); Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 
981, 991 (9th Cir. 2009).8 
Like the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit has 
determined that state anti-SLAPP fee-shifting 
provisions apply in federal court.  In Godin v. 
Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010), the court held 
that Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 556, which includes a provision for attorneys’ fees to 
prevailing defendants, “must be applied” in federal 
court.  Id. at 81.  The Godin court concluded that 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56 were not 
sufficiently broad “as to cover the issues within the 
scope of” Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, and that the 
dual purposes of Erie—discouragement of forum-
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration 
of the laws—“are best served” by enforcement of the 
anti-SLAPP statute in federal court.  Id. at 87-88.  The 
court also observed that declining to apply Maine’s 
statute would “result in an inequitable administration 
of justice between a defense asserted in state court and 
the same defense asserted in federal court,” specifically 
noting that doing so would allow a plaintiff filing in 
federal court to “circumvent any liability for a 
defendant’s attorney’s fees or costs.”  Id. at 92.  
Although it concluded that the Maine anti-SLAPP 
statute was “so intertwined with a state right or 
                                            
8  The Ninth Circuit had also applied Washington’s anti-SLAPP 
statute.  See Phoenix Trading, Inc. v. Loops LLC, 732 F.3d 936, 
941-42 (9th Cir. 2013).  However, in 2015, the Washington 
Supreme Court struck down the entire law because one of its 
provisions violated the state’s constitutional guarantee of a trial 
by jury, and the provision was not severable.  Davis v. Cox, 351 
P.3d 862, 864 (Wash. 2015). 
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remedy that it functions to define the scope of the 
state-created right,” and that no properly interpreted 
federal rule supplanted the Maine fee-shifting 
provision, id. at 89, the First Circuit noted that “if 
Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 were thought to preempt 
application of all of Section 556, a serious question 
might be raised under the Rules Enabling Act,” id. at 
90.9   
The Second Circuit too has found anti-SLAPP fee-
shifting provisions applicable in federal court.  In 
Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 718 F.3d 138 
(2d Cir. 2013), the Second Circuit confronted 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute and, like the Ninth 
Circuit, held that it applies in federal court.  The court 
of appeals explained that “federal courts apply those 
state rules of decision that are ‘substantive’ under Erie, 
and are consistent with federal law.”  Id. at 152.  
Because the anti-SLAPP statute was “a substantive 
policy favoring the special protection of certain 
defendants from the burdens of litigation because they 
engaged in constitutionally protected activity,” id. at 
148, the court held that the district court erred in 
concluding the anti-SLAPP rule did not apply, id. at 
156.  Then, in Adelson v. Harris, 774 F.3d 803 (2d Cir. 
2014), the Second Circuit held that Nevada’s anti-
SLAPP fee-shifting provision, Nev. Rev. Stat § 41.670, 
applies in federal court, calling its application 
                                            
9  The First Circuit has extended Godin’s holding concerning 
Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute to Massachusetts’s anti-SLAPP 
statute—which also includes a fee-shifting provision.  Steinmetz v. 
Coyle & Caron, Inc., 862 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2017) (applying Mass. 
Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 59H).  
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“unproblematic.”  Id. at 809 (citing Liberty 
Synergistics, 718 F.3d at 153)). 
And, citing the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Newsham, 
the Fifth Circuit has applied Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP 
statute, La. Code Civ. P. art. 971, in federal court.  
Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, LLC, 566 F.3d 164, 
168-69, 182-83 (5th Cir. 2009) (ordering dismissal of 
plaintiff’s complaint based on the statute’s burden-
shifting framework, and remanding the case “for a 
determination of [defendant’s] entitlement to fees and 
costs” under the anti-SLAPP law’s fee-shifting 
provision).10 
B. Two Circuits Have Held That Anti-SLAPP 
Fee-Shifting Provisions Are Inapplicable in 
Federal Court 
Parting ways with several of their sister circuits, 
the Tenth Circuit in the decision below joined the D.C. 
Circuit in concluding that a state anti-SLAPP fee-
                                            
10  Several times since Henry the Fifth Circuit has applied a state 
anti-SLAPP statute in deciding the case before it.  See, e.g., Cuba 
v. Pylant, 814 F.3d 701, 711 (5th Cir. 2016) (“The TCPA [Texas 
Citizen Participation Act] applies to these claims”).  In Cuba, the 
court observed: “The Henry court reasoned that even though the 
Louisiana anti-SLAPP statute was built around a procedural 
device—a special motion to dismiss—it nonetheless applied in 
federal court under the Erie doctrine because it was functionally 
substantive.”  Id. at 706 n.6.  Noting a circuit split, Judge Graves 
dissented in Cuba, arguing the TPCA should not apply in federal 
court, citing the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Abbas.  Id. at 719-20 & 
n.1 (“Our sister circuits that have considered this issue have 
split”).  Some Fifth Circuit panels applying state anti-SLAPP laws 
have assumed they apply without expressly deciding the question.  
See, e.g., Block v. Tanenhaus, 867 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 2017). 
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shifting provision may not be applied in federal court.  
See App. 16a-28a; see also supra at 16. 
In Abbas, the D.C. Circuit held that the D.C. anti-
SLAPP statute may not be applied in federal court.  
Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333-37.  Believing that the statute 
and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56 
“answer the same question,” id. at 1337, the Abbas 
court proceeded to consider whether those federal rules 
are valid.  Noting that Shady Grove’s fractured 
opinions failed to produce binding precedent regarding 
the “test for whether a Federal Rule violates the Rules 
Enabling Act,” id. at 1336-37, the Abbas court adopted 
the approach described in Justice Scalia’s plurality 
opinion, which “strictly followed” Sibbach v. Wilson & 
Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941), under which “any federal 
rule that ‘really regulates procedure’ is valid under the 
Rules Enabling Act.”  Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1337. 
Concluding that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 
and 56 “really regulate[] procedure,” the Abbas court 
determined they are “valid under the Rules Enabling 
Act” and preempt state rules that attempt to answer 
the “same question” differently.  Id. at 1337 (citing 
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14).  The court accordingly found 
that the district court had erred in granting an anti-
SLAPP motion to dismiss.  Id. at 1337.  And, even 
though the D.C. Circuit affirmed dismissal of the 
complaint on other grounds, the court refused to award 
fees or costs to the prevailing defendant, which were 
authorized by the D.C. anti-SLAPP law.  Abbas, 783 
F.3d at 1335 n.5.  Instead, the court held that the fee-
shifting provision could only apply in federal court if 
the other anti-SLAPP provision did as well.  Abbas, 
783 F.3d at 1335 n.3. 
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II. There Is a Circuit Split on the Applicability of 
State Anti-SLAPP Expedited Motions in 
Federal Court 
Twenty-four of the thirty-one anti-SLAPP 
jurisdictions have included provisions calling for some 
form of expedited consideration of anti-SLAPP 
motions.11  Two circuits, covering seven of the states 
that have enacted such provisions, have determined 
these expedited motion to dismiss provisions 
harmonize (or can be harmonized) with the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and should apply in federal 
court.  Two circuits—including the Tenth Circuit, in 
the decision below—covering five of the jurisdictions 
that have enacted such provisions, have determined 
they are inapplicable in federal court. 
As detailed above (supra at 20-21), in Godin, 629 
F.3d at 89-90, the First Circuit held that Maine’s anti-
SLAPP statute, Me. Rev. Stat. § 556, which calls for 
expedited consideration of an anti-SLAPP motion, 
applies in federal court.  The Fifth Circuit reached the 
                                            
11  See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-752(A); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-63-
507(a)(2); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(f); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-
196a(e); D.C. Code § 16-5502(d); Fla. Stat. § 768.295(4); Ga. Code 
Ann. § 9-11-11.1(d); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634F-2(1); 735 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. 110/20(a); Ind. Code § 34-7-7-9(a)(2); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-
5320(d), (f); La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 971(C)(3); Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 14, § 556; Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-807(d)(1); 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 59(H); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.528(1); 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,245; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(3)(f); N.M. 
Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.1(A); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, §§ 1433(A)-(C); Or. 
Rev. Stat. § 31.152(1); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 
§§ 27.004(a), 27.007(b); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1404(1)(b); Vt. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1041(d). 
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same conclusion with regard to Louisiana’s anti-
SLAPP law, and its expedited motion-to-dismiss 
provision, in Henry, 566 F.3d at 168-69. 
The Tenth Circuit in the decision below, and the 
D.C. Circuit, disagreed—as explained above (supra at 
16, 23-24).  See App. 19a-20a (“All subsection A 
demands is expedited procedures designed to promptly 
identify and dispose of [frivolous] lawsuits.”); Abbas, 
783 F.3d at 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that the 
District of Columbia’s expedited anti-SLAPP motion 
does not apply in federal court). 
III. The Decision Below Was Incorrect 
A. Anti-SLAPP Fee-Shifting Provisions 
Should Apply in Federal Court 
The Tenth Circuit’s refusal to apply New Mexico’s 
anti-SLAPP fee-shifting provision was incorrect—and 
can find little support in this Court’s precedents. 
No federal rule or law even arguably conflicts with 
New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP fee-shifting provision12—and 
                                            
12  Although the Tenth Circuit did not cite Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54, it creates a default rule that prevailing federal 
litigants are entitled to costs, but does not itself create an 
entitlement to fees.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(ii) (motion for 
fees must “specify . . . statute, rule, or other grounds entitling 
the movant to the award”); see also Medical Protective Co. v. 
Pang, 740 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Rule 54 provides a 
federal procedural mechanism for moving for attorney’s fees that 
are due under state law.”). 
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the Tenth Circuit cited none.13  See Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 
393, 410 (2010) (Scalia, J.) (“the framework we apply  
. . . requires first, determining whether the federal and 
state rules can be reconciled”). 
Because no federal rule answers the question 
whether Petitioners may recover attorneys’ fees if they 
prevail, New Mexico’s fee-shifting provision must 
govern because it is part of the State’s substantive law. 
Like other States’ analogous provisions, New 
Mexico’s Subsection B “creates a new liability where 
none existed before.”    Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan 
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555 (1949).  It does not regulate 
“merely the manner and the means by which a right to 
recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced”—it is a 
                                            
13  The decision below made no attempt to argue that a federal 
rule conflicts with the fee-shifting provision, and no federal rule 
does.  But even if there were an arguable conflict, the fee shifting 
provision is “so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it 
functions to define the scope of the state created right” and so 
“cannot be displaced by” the federal rules.  Godin, 629 F.3d at 89 
(quoting Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring)).  
“Further, if [the federal rules] were thought to preempt 
application of” that provision, “a serious question might be raised 
under the Rules Enabling Act,” id., as it is highly doubtful 
whether the Act permits this Court to preempt a state’s 
mandatory fee-shifting provision.  Faced with a (hypothetical) 
colorable argument that some federal rule did conflict with a 
state’s fee-shifting provision, the proper course would be for this 
Court to adopt a “saving construction” of the federal rule to 
comport with the Rules Enabling Act’s command that the federal 
rule “shall not abridge . . . or modify any substantive right”—
including substantive rights based on state law.  Shady Grove, 
559 U.S. at 422-23 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
  
 
27 
 
“right to recover.”  Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109.  
See also Chambers, 501 U.S. at 52 (“fee-shifting 
rules . . . embody a [state] substantive policy” when a 
statute “permits a prevailing party in certain classes of 
litigation to recover fees”); 17A Moore’s Federal 
Practice–Civil § 124.07[3][b] (2008) (“State law 
generally governs a litigant’s entitlement to an award 
of attorney’s fees because attorney fee statutes are 
substantive state law.”) (citing Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 259 
n.31); 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 2669 (3d ed. 2014) (“[C]ases holding state 
law controlling . . . appear analytically sounder. . . . 
[and] particularly appropriate . . . when state law 
provides for the recovery of an attorney's fee as a part 
of the claim being asserted.”).   
As such, “the accident of suit by a non-resident 
litigant in federal court instead of in a State court a 
block away” cannot be allowed to determine New 
Mexico’s prerogative to create and enforce that right to 
recover.  Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109.  The First 
Circuit correctly recognized this in Godin, when it 
observed that declining to apply Maine’s anti-SLAPP 
statute would “result in an inequitable administration 
of justice between a defense asserted in state court and 
the same defense asserted in federal court,” specifically 
noting that doing so would allow a plaintiff filing in 
federal court to “circumvent any liability for a 
defendant’s attorney’s fees or costs.”  629 F.3d at 92.  
Applying New Mexico’s fee-shifting provision in federal 
court would advance Erie’s “twin aims”—
“discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of 
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inequitable administration of the laws.”  Hanna, 380 
U.S. at 468.14   
The decision below “represent[s] a serious 
encroachment on state-created rights in the absence of 
a clear countervailing federal policy.”  10 Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2669 (3d ed. 
2014); cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 443 (2010) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (This Court’s “decisions instruct over 
and over again that, in the adjudication of diversity 
cases, state interests . . . warrant our respectful 
consideration.”).   The purpose of New Mexico’s anti-
SLAPP statute “is to protect citizens who exercise their 
right to petition from the financial burden of having to 
defend against retaliatory lawsuits.”  Cordova, 396 
P.3d at 165.  That objective was frustrated by the 
Tenth Circuit’s refusal to apply the statute’s fee-
shifting provision in federal court.15 
                                            
14  The Tenth Circuit concluded that New Mexico intended 
Subsection B as a “sanctions” provision, which the court therefore 
viewed as “procedural.”  App. 22a.  The better reading is that 
Subsection B is exactly what it says it is: a state-law provision 
awarding attorneys’ fees to all prevailing defendants whose speech 
or public participation has become the target of litigation.  But in 
any event, a proper analysis under Erie “looks not to 
the labels but to the content of state rules of decision.”  Liberty 
Synergistics, 718 F.3d at 152.  
15  The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that attorneys’ fees 
and costs made available under the State’s anti-SLAPP statute 
are available even when dismissal is based on federal law.  See 
Cordova, 396 P.3d at 162 (affirming dismissal based on the First 
Amendment, but reversing lower court’s determination that anti-
SLAPP statute did not apply, and holding that “Petitioners are 
statutorily entitled to an award of attorney fees”). 
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B. Anti-SLAPP Provisions for Expedited 
Consideration of Motions Should Apply in 
Federal Court 
Subsection A of New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP statute 
provides that a SLAPP suit “is subject to a special 
motion to dismiss, motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, or motion for summary judgment that shall 
be considered by the court on a priority or expedited 
basis to ensure the early consideration of the issues 
raised by the motion and to prevent the unnecessary 
expense of litigation.”  N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.1(A).  
The Tenth Circuit held that Subsection A is 
“procedural” as a matter of New Mexico law and 
therefore inapplicable in federal court.  But, as with its 
assessment of the statute’s fee-shifting provision, the 
court’s analysis and conclusion are both incorrect.   
No federal statute or rule conflicts with the New 
Mexico anti-SLAPP statute’s expedited motion to 
dismiss provision.   
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56, which 
govern aspects of motions to dismiss and for summary 
judgment in federal court, are silent about the timing 
of a court’s consideration of such motions.  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12, 56.  Unlike in Shady Grove, they do not answer 
the “same question.”  559 U.S. at 399. 
The panel’s contrary holding ignored this, focusing 
entirely on the supposed “procedural” character of New 
Mexico’s expedited motion to dismiss provision.  But 
“[r]ules which lawyers call procedural do not always 
exhaust their effect by regulating procedure.”  Cohen, 
337 U.S. at 555.  New Mexico’s expedited-motion-to-
dismiss provision is “so intertwined with a state right 
or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the 
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state created right,” and is appropriately viewed as 
“substantive” for purposes of an Erie analysis.  Shady 
Grove, 559 U.S. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring).   
The Tenth Circuit’s refusal to give effect to the right 
to expedited disposition conferred by New Mexico’s 
anti-SLAPP statute also runs counter to well-
established federal law that a federal court “cannot 
give a [state-created claim] longer life in the federal 
court than it would have had in the state court without 
adding something to the cause of action.”  Ragan v. 
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 
533-34 (1949). 
In a closer case than this one, a federal rule of 
procedure arguably in conflict with a state law 
provision would have to be read with “sensitivity to 
important state interests,” Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 
421 (Stevens, J., concurring)—to both faithfully 
interpret the Rules Enabling Act, and avoid if possible 
a reading that would render the federal rule invalid, 
id. at 422-24.  Those considerations, combined with the 
longstanding presumption that federal law does not 
“cavalierly” preempt state law, Wyeth v. Levine, 555 
U.S. 555, 565 n.3 (2009), and the special force of that 
presumption in the Rules Enabling Act area, reinforce 
the conclusion that there is no conflict here. 
In any event, reconciling Subsection A with Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12, so that both can apply, does 
not present a serious problem.  They “can exist side by 
side, . . . each controlling its own intended sphere of 
coverage without conflict.” Walker, 446 U.S. at 752.  A 
federal court can plainly “give effect to the substantive 
thrust” of Subsection A “without untoward alteration of 
the federal scheme” governing dispositive motions.  
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426. 
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IV. This Case Is an Excellent Vehicle for 
Resolving the Circuit Split Regarding the 
Important Questions Presented 
The proliferation of anti-SLAPP statutes is one of 
the most significant statutory developments affecting 
speech and public debate in recent decades.  And as 
anti-SLAPP statutes have multiplied, so have cases 
about them.  See Travelers Casualty Ins. Co. of Am. v. 
Hirsh, 831 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2016) (Kozinski, 
J., concurring) (reporting that anti-SLAPP “cases have 
more than tripled over the last ten years”).   
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But the well-recognized divide among the courts of 
appeals about their application in federal court16 is 
promoting forum-shopping and undercutting the 
efficacy of anti-SLAPP laws. 
Given the prevalence of anti-SLAPP laws and their 
impact on the exercise of First Amendment rights, the 
                                            
16  See, e.g., 19 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure 
§ 4509 (3d ed. 2016) (discussing “divergent case law currently 
surrounding statutes meant to curb the use of . . . SLAPP 
lawsuits,” and observing that “[r]esolution of some of the 
questions raised by anti-SLAPP statutes may require resolution 
by the Supreme Court”); William James Seidleck, Comment, Anti-
SLAPP Statutes and the Federal Rules: Why Preemption Analysis 
Show They Should Apply in Federal Diversity Suits, 166 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 547, 548 (2018) (“The anti-SLAPP circuit split now offers the 
Supreme Court a unique opportunity to correct the broader 
confusion over the relationship between the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and state laws.”); David C. Thornton, Comment, 
Evaluating Anti-SLAPP Protection in the Federal Arena: An 
Incomplete Paradigm of Conflict, 27 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 
119, 121 (2016) (“circuit courts are divided in their determination 
of whether state anti-SLAPP laws apply in federal courts”); see 
also Travelers Casualty, 831 F.3d at 1183 (Kozinski, J., 
concurring) (Observing after Abbas was decided by the D.C. 
Circuit: “Now we’ve got a circuit split, and we’re standing on the 
wrong side.”); Cuba v. Pylant, 814 F.3d 701, 718 n.1 (5th Cir. 
2016) (Graves, J., dissenting) (“Our sister circuits that have 
considered this issue have split, with some deciding that federal 
courts may apply Anti-SLAPP statutes.”); Mitchell v. Hood, 614 
Fed. App’x. 137, 139 n.1 (5th Cir. 2015) (“there is disagreement 
among courts of appeals as to whether state anti-SLAPP laws are 
applicable in federal court at all”); Intercon Solutions, Inc. v. Basel 
Action Network, 791 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting 
“disagreement among appellate judges”); Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1335 
(acknowledging contrary decisions by the First, Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits). 
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disparate treatment of states by their home federal 
circuits concerning application of their anti-SLAPP 
statutes is sufficient to warrant this Court’s 
intervention.  But the problem is even more acute.  A 
California speaker can rely on the Ninth Circuit to 
afford her the protection of her home state’s anti-
SLAPP law.  But what if that California speaker is 
sued in federal court in the Tenth Circuit or the 
District of Columbia?  Even if local choice-of-law rules 
mandate the application of California law, local circuit 
precedent holding anti-SLAPP provisions inapplicable 
in federal court would deny her all the California law 
to which she is entitled.  Cf. Adelson, 774 F.3d at 809 
(Second Circuit analyzing, independently and de novo, 
the applicability of Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute in 
federal court, despite the Ninth Circuit’s earlier 
resolution of the issue). 
This case presents the Court with an opportunity to 
consider the applicability in federal court of two 
specific, but widely implemented, anti-SLAPP 
provisions—without having to decide the applicability 
in federal court of every feature of state anti-SLAPP 
laws.17  Providing much-needed guidance to the lower 
                                            
17  Some circuits have taken a piecemeal approach in evaluating 
the applicability of particular anti-SLAPP provisions in federal 
court.  The Second Circuit has held that two provisions of 
Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute are applicable in federal court, but 
explained that a third, which bars discovery upon filing of an anti-
SLAPP motion, “may present a closer question.”  Adelson, 774 
F.3d at 809.  The Ninth Circuit has held that the California anti-
SLAPP statute’s fee-shifting and “special motion to strike” 
provisions must apply in federal court, Verizon Delaware, Inc. v. 
Covad Commc’ns Co., 377 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2004), but has 
separately held that the statute’s discovery-limiting provisions 
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courts will enable those courts to address disputes 
about other anti-SLAPP provisions informed by, and 
with the benefit of, this Court’s views about the 
questions presented in this petition. 
CONCLUSION 
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be 
granted. 
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and limitations on amendment must not, id.; Metabolife Int’l, Inc. 
v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 845 (9th Cir. 2001).  The Eleventh 
Circuit has recognized the circuit splits discussed here, but held 
that a different provision—the Georgia anti-SLAPP statute’s then-
effective requirement that a complaint be accompanied by an 
attorney’s “written verification under oath,” Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-
11.1(b) (West 2015)—could not apply in federal court because it 
was preempted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.  Royalty 
Network, Inc. v. Harris, 756 F.3d 1351, 1357-62 (11th Cir. 2014); 
but see id. at 1362-63 (Jordan, J., concurring).  
